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The French Socialist and German Social 
Democratic Parties and the Future of the 
Working Class in the European Coal & Steel 
Community, 1948-1954 
Brian SHAEV * 
Although the status of workers in the European Coal & Steel Community (ECSC) was 
not the determining factor in French Socialist (SFIO) and German Social Democratic 
(SPD) policy towards the Schuman Plan, the two parties made sustained efforts to 
protect workers’ interests within the Community. During the Schuman Plan debates, 
SPD leaders argued that they had higher chances of enacting a program of full 
employment and socialization at the national level, rather than within a 
supranational community, while the SFIO leaders concluded that the High Authority 
would strengthen the influence of workers in the coal and steel industries. After ECSC 
ratification, the SFIO and SPD criticized the paucity of the ECSC’s social achievements, 
and consistently pressured the High Authority to enforce the social provisions of the 
Treaty of Paris. 
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s the French National Assembly concluded its debate on the ratification of 
the accords to institute a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 
December 1951, Socialist deputy Guy Desson evoked Fritz Lang‟s 
dystopian film Metropolis to argue that the Assembly had not devoted 
sufficient attention to the prospects of workers in the proposed Community. He 
declared: 
 
We have spoken much of coal. We have spoken much of steel. But although the 
balance between these two important factors of the economy has been kept in 
balance, we have greatly neglected those who extract the coal and minerals, those 
who make the steel.1 
 
Although Desson admitted that he may have exaggerated when he spoke of not 
wanting to see established in France «these gigantic termite mounds where colonies of 
workers live at the prey of a managerial organization»2, his critique was in large part 
accurate: the position of coal and steel workers was not central to the French National 
Assembly‟s debate on the ECSC. In addition, it was not the determining factor for 
Desson‟s party, the French Socialist Party (SFIO), when the party decided that it would 
support the ECSC. Although he went on to argue that the ECSC would be beneficial to 
workers, a comment by Socialist Léon Boutbien, charged with presenting the National 
Assembly Labor Commission‟s recommendation on the ECSC, is illustrative of the 
relative subordination of workers‟ interests in the debate: 
 
When it comes to replacing a policy of hatred with a policy of effective collaboration 
between peoples, we have every reason to believe that the workers of France will 
not remain indifferent to such preoccupations.3 
 
The ECSC was designed principally to establish a basis for the «organized 
cooperation»4 and reconciliation between the French and German governments, and to 
assure an adequate supply of German coal for French industry. As such, the position of 
workers was also of secondary consideration in the debate that occurred in West 
Germany. Much more prominent in the French and German parliamentary debates 
                                                 
1 Journal officiel (JO) 1951 9008. December 11, 1951. Desson voted with his party in support of 
the ECSC. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 8871, December 6, 1951. 
4 WILLIS, Roy, France, Germany, and the New Europe: 1945-1967, Stanford, Stanford 
University Press, 1968. 
A 
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from 1950 to early 1952 were concerns about the ability of French and German 
industries to compete in a tariff-free coal and steel community, the self-exclusion of 
Great Britain and Scandinavia, the assertion of democratic controls over the 
Community‟s institutions, the long-standing antagonism between the French and 
German governments, and geopolitical concerns rooted in early Cold War politics.  
This article investigates how the French Socialist Party and German Social 
Democratic Party (SPD) envisioned the position of coal and steel workers in the ECSC. 
These parties presented themselves as advocates for industrial workers and were in 
constant competition for the allegiance of the working class with the French 
Communist (PCF) and German Communist (KPD) parties. With much of their 
attention consumed by the rapid series of events in a period that included the Berlin 
blockade, the creation of a West German state, and the launch of the Korean War, it is 
perhaps understandable that the interests of workers in France and Germany‟s 
principal industrial regions were not the central factors in Socialist deliberations on the 
Schuman Plan. It is therefore also not surprising that the secondary literature on the 
policies of the SFIO and SPD toward early European integration initiatives does not 
discuss in detail how these parties worked to fulfill their programmatic role as 
defenders of the working class during the debates on the ECSC. 
However, although these parties did not place workers at the center of their 
response to Robert Schuman‟s proposal of 9 May 1950, their influence was important 
for their governments‟ decisions to insert protections for workers into the treaty. It is 
therefore worth considering how SFIO and SPD economic and industrial goals during 
the period preceding Schuman‟s announcement informed the parties‟ views of the 
Community‟s likely impact on workers. This article begins by discussing the parties‟ 
assessments of the position of workers under proposals for European integration from 
1948 to 1950, and then analyzes how these positions informed the SFIO‟s support for 
and the SPD‟s opposition to the ECSC from 1950 until the Bundestag‟s ratification of 
the Treaty of Paris in January 1952. There follows an examination of the concerns and 
pressure French Socialists and German Social Democrats exerted in the Common 
Assembly of the ECSC in their defense of industrial workers during the initial period of 
the Community‟s existence from 1952 to 1954. 
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1. SFIO and SPD Industrial and Economic Policy, 1948-1949 
 
In the late 1940s both the French Socialists and German Social Democrats were in a 
pitched rhetorical and grass-roots battle with the French and German Communist 
parties, which SFIO and SPD leaders accused of pursuing a subversive campaign to 
undermine democracy. As strikes swept industrial France from 1947-1949 and the Ruhr 
workers vocally displayed a resolute opposition to the Allied policy of dismantling and 
splitting up German industry, SFIO and SPD leaders worried that unemployment and a 
degradation in workers‟ living standards could result in a radicalization of the working 
class. In this context, the parties‟ traditional assertion of the need for programs to 
achieve full employment received an added urgency. 
On this issue the SFIO and SPD were in agreement: full employment must be the 
policy of their governments and should be at the center of any European-level recovery 
plan. In fall 1949 and spring 1950 the Socialist parties of Europe met numerous times 
to craft a united industrial policy. The SFIO submitted a “Report on the Mobility of 
Labor” to the September 1949 meeting of the COMISCO, a precursor to the 
reconstructed Socialist International, in which the party argued for a semi-planned 
economy with full employment, defined, following William Beveridge‟s influential war-
time study, as an unemployment rate under 3% of the active population5. The SPD 
shared the SFIO‟s concern, and asserted that the conference should call for a wage, 
price, and production policy designed to achieve full employment6. When COMISCO 
held a meeting of Socialist economic experts in late March 1950 in the Ruhr, the 
delegates were unanimous in support of industrial investment programs centered on 
the goal of full employment7. Such a policy was particularly pressing for French 
Socialists and German Social Democrats because both parties pointed to signs that the 
working class was losing ground in terms of wages and influence as the governments 
shifted to the right in France and Germany. In addition, grass-roots labor mobilization 
around the call for co-determination in the management of industry in the Ruhr area 
made this demand a defining feature of SPD industrial policy. 
Although both the SFIO and SPD leaderships shared many economic goals and 
initially reacted to Schuman‟s 1950 announcement with hesitation and non-
                                                 
5 Archiv der sozialen Demokratie (AdsD), 2/PVBT3, SFIO Rapport sur la mobilité de la main 
d‟oeuvre. 
6 Kurzer Bericht zur Sachverständigenkonferenz des COMISCO vom 11.–16. September 1949 in 
Oerenaes/Schweden. September, 24 1949. Ibid. 
7 AdsD, 2/PVBT4, Witten/Ruhr von 26./31./ März 1950, Bericht über die Tagung der 
COMISCO-Wirtschaftsexperten. 
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commitment, the positions that these parties eventually adopted on the ECSC were 
consistent with the logic of the policies that they had crafted in 1948-1949 in response 
to the proposals for an International Authority of the Ruhr (IAR). The SFIO and SPD 
both rejected the punitive German policy of the French governments of 1945 to 1947. 
They did not, however, agree about the best means of preventing the re-concentration 
of power in the hands of industrial magnates who, they argued, had assisted Adolf 
Hitler‟s rise to power. The attention of the Allied governments from 1946 to 1950 was 
fixated on the future of the Ruhr territory, the heart of Europe‟s coal and steel 
industries, and the arsenal for the Nazis‟ militarization of Germany. German Social 
Democrats adamantly asserted the need to prevent a restitution of the Ruhr mines and 
steel factories to their former owners and presented the socialization of these heavy 
industries as the only possible solution. 
French Socialists, however, were not satisfied that the socialization or 
nationalization of German heavy industry would suffice to prevent the region from yet 
again being exploited by a German government for the purposes of war. Crucially, the 
SFIO leadership shared the goals of Jean Monnet‟s Planning Commission, which had 
embarked on the renovation and expansion of France‟s industrial capacity. The central 
obstacle to the modernization of French industry, however, was a shortage of coal and, 
as Jean Monnet and his entourage argued time and again, the coal imports that France 
desperately needed could only come from one source: the Ruhr. Therefore, due to both 
economic factors and apprehension about the future intentions and composition of a 
future German government, the SFIO leadership asserted that the internationalization, 
rather than socialization, of the Ruhr was necessary to assure French national and 
economic security. 
This disagreement, and the controversial status of the Saar, which was detached 
from Germany and entered into economic union with France, poisoned relations 
between the SFIO and the SPD. German Social Democrats raised a series of objections 
to the International Authority of the Ruhr, which was formally set up in August 1949, 
the month when the Federal Republic of Germany became a state. The SPD critique 
focused largely around the continuation of the policy of dismantling factories. In the 
SPD‟s view, the IAR‟s policy in effect blocked the chances for socialization within West 
Germany. For SPD leader Kurt Schumacher, socialization, though a long-term party 
economic goal, was principally justified in terms of political power. The Ruhr industrial 
magnates, SPD leaders asserted, must not regain control of the industrial center of 
West Germany, which they could then use to re-launch German militarism. Turning to 
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the occupying powers, Schumacher also denounced that in Allied negotiations the Ruhr 
«population and its labour [were] regarded as mere objects». He argued: 
 
An authority which represents such a concentration of power has a tremendously 
strong position as an employer, and what is more, this all-powerful employer is, for 
the mass of the German workers, clerks and technicians, a foreigner working for 
foreign interests. Thus the social tensions existing between employers and 
employees will be intensified by national dissensions.8 
 
For Schumacher and other SPD leaders, a nationalist struggle reminiscent of the 
1923 coal and steel workers‟ revolt against the French occupation of the Ruhr would 
divert workers‟ attention from the class struggle. In addition, the displacement of 
authority from the factories to an international body would create an additional 
obstacle to German workers‟ campaign for co-determination in management. This 
critique that workers‟ influence would be diluted by the IAR was resurrected in the 
SPD‟s later campaign against the Schuman Plan. 
Faced with the liberalization of trade under the auspices of the Organization for 
European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), both the SFIO and SPD worried that their 
national industries would enter a free trade environment at a disadvantage. German 
Social Democrats argued that industrial dismantlement in Germany, coupled with the 
sustained industrial investment program in France, had resulted in a great loss in the 
competitive potential of the Ruhr area. For the French Socialists, the concern was 
different. Party economist André Philip argued to the party‟s National Council in 1948 
that, «The day one eliminates customs barriers without having done the preparatory 
work, the least profitable businesses will eliminate the others through competition», 
which will result in unemployment and idle machinery. Philip, one of the party‟s 
staunchest supporters of trade liberalization and European integration, argued that a 
«customs union ought to be accompanied by the unity of legislation as it concerns fiscal 
policy, salaries, social security and monetary policy»9. The demand for the 
harmonization of social policies became a staple of French Socialist policy towards 
proposals for European unity through the 1950s. 
Faced with proposals for a customs union with Italy and the Benelux countries in 
late 1949, French Socialist Francis Leenhardt argued that the party must proceed 
cautiously because Belgium and Italy had higher levels of unemployment and therefore 
                                                 
8 AdsD, Bestand Kurt Schumacher (BKS) 46, «SPD and Ruhr Statute», February 1949. 
9 Office universitaire de recherche socialiste (OURS), Conseil national, April 27-8, 1948. 
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a customs union could result in spiraling unemployment rates in France10. Considering 
this issue at the SFIO‟s extraordinary National Congress in December, Socialist 
Christian Pineau, the future foreign minister who oversaw the negotiations for the 
Treaties of Rome, argued that without an economic organization, the liberalization of 
trade would result in «the countries with the worst social conditions having an 
advantage compared with those with better social conditions» a situation that would 
result in the «invasion of foreign products against French industry […] that would lead 
us […] to extract margins from the working class» in order to remain competitive. This 
would be particularly alarming if «we find ourselves one day faced with German 
competition that has equipment superior to our own, [and] with workers paid less than 
we». Guy Mollet, while declaring his support for Germany‟s integration into the 
Western economy, declared that «I will not accept […] that a country could benefit 
from not having realized the same social conditions for its proletariat (and through) 
distorted competition, with a sort of dumping, come to compete and throw the French 
worker into unemployment»11. 
Both parties, however, generally supported the liberalization of trade as a means to 
advance European unity and modernize industry but argued that state planning and 
investment programs to ensure full employment must accompany any liberalization. 
Hence, when Schuman announced his plan in May 1950, the contours for what would 
be the French Socialist and German Social Democratic view of the likely impact of the 
ECSC on workers were already in place. While both parties advocated a forceful state-
sponsored policy of full employment and supported in principle the lowering of tariffs, 
the SPD worried that international management would hamper coal and steel workers‟ 
struggle for socialization and co-determination, and the SFIO argued that French 
workers would suffer increased unemployment unless the social spending of its 
neighbors was raised to the levels prevailing in France. 
 
2. Coal and Steel Workers in French Socialist and German Social 
Democratic Debates on the Schuman Plan, May 1950-January 1952 
 
Although there were enthusiastic supporters among the leadership of both parties, 
the SFIO and the SPD reacted cautiously to Schuman‟s 9 May 1950 proposal. While the 
central committees of both parties issued statements welcoming the plan in principle, 
they reserved their position until they could see its details. Over the next six months, 
                                                 
10 OURS, Comité directeur, November 10, 1949. 
11 OURS, Congrès national extraordinaire, December 13-14, 1949.  
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the assessments of the two parties diverged: the SFIO came to publicly support the plan 
and objected to the strenuous opposition first announced by Kurt Schumacher in 
October 1950. The possible impact of Schuman‟s proposal on coal and steel workers 
was not the principal issue around which internal party debates on the ECSC 
developed. In fact, there is no record of a discussion of the plan‟s possible impact on the 
working class in the minutes of the SFIO central committee meeting of 10 May 1950, 
nor did the party mention workers in the list of conditions that it published as a result 
of this meeting12. Kurt Schumacher, on the other hand, raised the issue of co-
determination on 11 May 1950 and argued that the trade unions must play important 
roles in the proposed supranational institutions13. 
Over the next year and a half the German Social Democrats developed a 
comprehensive and multifaceted critique of the Schuman Plan and conducted a 
passionate campaign to defeat the treaty. Among their objections were assertions that 
the managerial influence that coal and steel workers had attained after the war, an 
influence that was codified and expanded by the May 1951 law that guaranteed co-
determination in industry, would decline under a supranational authority. The SPD 
leadership displayed a marked suspicion towards the proposed High Authority, the 
brainchild of Jean Monnet, who led France‟s modernization program. In the 
ratification debate of January 1952, SPD deputy Willi Birkelbach asserted that the 
presence of workers‟ representatives in the Advisory Committee, «whose name itself 
gives expression to its meaningless», represented a decline in workers‟ influence vis-à-
vis management. Schumacher‟s successor as SPD chair, Erich Ollenhauer, stated that 
the presence of at most one trade unionist on the High Authority was a setback 
compared to the voice that workers had obtained in West Germany14. In April 1951 the 
SPD published a pamphlet entitled What do you know about the Schuman Plan? that 
laid out the argument that the beneficiary of the proposal «is the international coal 
trade, which will dominate production and working people». That same month SPD 
deputy Gerhard Lütkens condemned the proposed High Authority, which, in his view, 
would replace the power of consumer organizations and trade unions with that of 
employers and technocrats. The proposed Common Assembly was too weak, he argued, 
                                                 
12 OURS, Comité directeur, May 10, 1950. 
13 AdsD, BKS 51, «Schumachers Nein zum Europa-Rat: Grund: Gleichzeitiger Beitritt der Saar» 
May 11, 2011. 
14 AdsD, Bestand Erich Ollenhauer (BEO) 77, Übertragung der Rede des 2. Vorsitzenden der 
SPD Erich Ollenhauer, am 14.4.1951 im Redoutensaal zu Erlangen «Die SPD im Kampf um 
Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit». 
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to effectively stymie the combined power of capitalists and supranational bureaucrats15. 
This position led the SPD into conflict with the principal German trade union 
federation, the DGB, which supported the Schuman Plan. 
The SFIO, conversely, came to the conclusion that the High Authority would 
strengthen the influence of workers. While the SPD argued that the High Authority 
would exercise a dictatorship over the working class in alliance with employers, Philip 
viewed the intervention of a supranational body between the workers and management 
as an advance for workers and a bulwark against employers‟ power. The contrast in the 
parties‟ assessments was, no doubt, in part the consequence of the success of the SPD‟s 
campaign for co-determination in Germany, a practice that did not exist in France. 
Also, the SFIO leaders enjoyed close, personal relations with Jean Monnet and hence 
believed that the High Authority would not work to solely represent employers‟ 
interests. In the French ratification debates, Boutbien declared that he was satisfied 
with the position granted workers‟ representatives in the ECSC, though he also wanted 
to see this position further strengthened. He welcomed that workers shared equal 
representation with consumers and employers in the Advisory Committee and that the 
workers‟ representatives could petition the High Authority. Boutbien asked the French 
government, though, to seek an agreement to compel the High Authority to consult the 
Advisory Committee when making any decision concerning salaries, or if one-third of 
the committee members requested a hearing16. 
While arguing that the Schuman Plan was nothing more than a renewed attempt to 
gain French hegemony over the German population and its resources, Schumacher 
declared to an audience of 60.000 in Dortmund, an industrial city in the Ruhr, that 
«The Schuman Plan means unemployment!»17. Efforts to disband the German coal 
distribution cartel would result, according to Ollenhauer, in mass unemployment for 
miners18. SPD speakers argued on numerous occasions that the dismantlement and 
lack of investment in German industry after the war meant that German coal and steel 
workers would suffer if placed in competition with their neighbors. When discussing 
the Schuman Plan in July 1950, Schumacher pointed out that the negotiating countries 
were «the six countries [in Western Europe] with the lowest wages and highest 
                                                 
15 AdsD, Bestand Willi Eichler 114, SPD-Pressedienst 20 April 1951, Dr. G. Lütkens, «Die 
Montanunion der „Festen Hand‟». 
16 JO 1951 8871. December 6, 1951. 
17 AdsD, BKS 53, Dortmund 8.10.1950, Kundgebung der 60 000 auf dem Hansaplatz. 
18 AdsD, BEO 77, «Die SPD und der Schuman-Plan». Rede des 2. Vorsitzenden Ollenahuer in 
Bremen am 18. Juni 1951. 
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unemployment»19. A customs union with low-wage countries, rather than with 
Scandinavia or Great Britain, where social democratic and labor governments were in 
power, portended the stagnation or decline of wages for German industrial workers. 
At a meeting of the Socialist International dedicated to discussing the Schuman 
Plan, SFIO representative Salomon Grumbach condemned the SPD for asserting that 
the Schuman Plan would create mass unemployment. Lütkens responded for the SPD 
that the High Authority‟s control of resource distribution «made it impossible for 
certain countries to carry out their own full employment policies». He was not satisfied 
that Article 2 of the treaty declared full employment as a principal goal of the 
Community and suggested that amendments to the treaty, including for a body to 
supervise the High Authority, should be inserted to strengthen its commitment to full 
employment. Inspired by the examples of the Labour government in Great Britain and 
Social Democratic governments in Scandinavia, the criticism emanating from the SPD 
makes it clear that the party leaders believed that they had greater chances of enacting 
a program of full employment and socialization at the national level rather than within 
a supranational community. This reflects SPD optimism for the upcoming 1953 
national elections, during a period in which the French Socialist Party was suffering a 
marked decline in membership and votes. Grumbach took aim at the SPD‟s claim that 
the ECSC would block socialization, claiming that the SFIO had made clear to its 
government that it would oppose any treaty that hampered its ability to socialize 
industry or might threaten the nationalized French coal industry. About his German 
colleagues, Grumbach stated: 
 
We specifically asked them which articles of the Schuman Plan prevent 
socialization or workers‟ participation, and which articles lead to the fear that 
unemployment would be created. We could not find them.20 
 
There were sustained worries within the SFIO as well that unemployment might 
result from a customs union of coal and steel. At its National Congress a few weeks 
after the announcement of the Schuman Plan, these fears came to the fore. Unaware 
that the Korean War would soon break out and generate a dearth of steel during the 
production boom of 1950-1952, Philip argued that the coal and steel industries were 
moving towards an overproduction that would conjure increased competition and 
                                                 
19 AdsD, BKS 52, Ansprache Dr. Kurt Schumachers in einer Funktionärversammlung der 
sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands am 31. Juli 1950 um 17.30 Uhr.  
20 International Institute for Social History (IISH), SI-241, Minutes of the Conference on the 
Schuman Plan Frankfurt a./M., 27.-28. 1951.  
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unemployment as less productive businesses closed. He placed Germany in the center 
of his analysis: suffering two million unemployed and an exploding trade deficit, 
Germany would be forced to greatly increase its exports. With salaries and benefits 
much lower than those of French workers, the liberalization of German coal and steel 
would lead to “social dumping” and the closure of less productive French coal mines. 
Particularly threatened, Jouve pointed out, were the mines of the North and Pas-de-
Calais, while the Lorraine region would remain competitive. Socialist leader Guy 
Mollet, who represented the Nord, was dismayed that: 
 
This French-German duo will mean the destruction of whichever of the two 
countries seeks to give a higher standard of living to its proletariat, even if [that 
country] has not actually done all that much good; it means social dumping, and 
will give an advantage to that [country] which, at the present moment, makes its 
workers labor sixty or sixty-five hour work days without social security.21 
 
Unlike the SPD, however, the SFIO leaders argued that the solution to these 
problems lay in strengthening the authority of the supranational authority on social 
issues. Philip stated that, «It is necessary to organize the heavy industries, coordinate 
investments; it is necessary that the problem of full employment be posed now on the 
European plane». The High Authority should be invested with powers to counter the 
impact of economic liberalism with a salary adjustment fund, a fiscal adjustment fund, 
organisms to equalize prices, and the coordination of investments in such a way as to 
ensure full employment22. When the Treaty of Paris came up for ratification, Boutbien 
welcomed that Article Three called for «promoting the amelioration of working 
conditions, permitting progressive equalization». He went on to argue that social 
charges in France were not nearly as different from those in Germany as other 
members of the Assembly had argued23. Not all Socialist deputies, however, were as 
optimistic as Boutbien. Desson spoke of unemployment sweeping certain regions at a 
rapid pace; Robert Lacoste worried that the transition period for the lowering of tariffs 
was too short24. This danger could be averted by the extension of state investments 
plans, a demand upon which the SFIO made its vote conditional. These were, of course, 
the same investment plans that the SPD argued placed German industry at a 
                                                 
21 OURS, Congrès national, May 26-29, 1950. 
22 Ibid. 
23 JO 1951 8871-2. December 6, 1951. 
24 Ibid. 1951 8919-21. December 7, 1951. Ibid. 9008. December 11, 1951. 
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disadvantage. Lacoste also welcomed that the treaty permitted compensation to 
businesses who suffered competitive pressures due to rising salaries. 
The most emotionally-charged aspect of the ECSC ratification debates in the French 
National Assembly was the issue of labor migration. Article 69 of the ECSC treaty called 
for the free movement of coal and steel workers between national industries. Seconded 
at times by the right, French Communists made the specter of French migration to 
German industry the central thrust of their attack against the Schuman Plan. The 
ECSC, they charged, represented the realization of Hitler‟s dream of a German-
dominated Europe and the ECSC would result in a new form of Fritz Sauckel‟s labor 
deportation program, with the free market doing the work once performed by Nazi 
occupiers. The polemical framing of this argument aside, the initial reaction of French 
Socialists displayed a different concern. At the May 1950 National Congress, Jouve and 
Mollet worried that high German unemployment would result in a flood of German 
workers into France, creating a downward pressure on wages25. Kurt Schumacher was 
also concerned that the ECSC would create a mass migration of German steel workers 
to France. Such assertions highlight the somewhat contradictory nature of SPD policy, 
as the free movement of labor within the OEEC zone was a demand the party had put 
forth since 1949, and continued to do so on the eve of the ECSC‟s ratification26. 
At the French Assembly debate, Boutbien gave voice to the trade unions‟ fears of 
mass labor migration into France. However, he said that he was confident that the High 
Authority would be attentive to the social repercussions of any large-scale migration. 
The Labor Commission, he announced, called for the ECSC to establish an 
international card designating a workers‟ professional qualification before migrating27. 
Across the Rhine, Birkelbach argued that migrant workers might suffer discrimination 
if the community did not adopt adequate safeguards28. The ECSC was ratified with the 
support of the SFIO by the French National Assembly on 13 December 1951, and over 
the strenuous opposition of the SPD by the Bundestag on 11 January 1952. French 
Socialists and German Social Democrats henceforth brought their critiques, proposals 
and evaluations of social protections for coal and steel workers to a new level: the 
Common Assembly of the European Coal & Steel Community. 
  
                                                 
25 OURS, Congrès national, May 26-29, 1950. 
26 AdsD, Bestand Rudolf Pass 14,Veit dch. H. Hermsdorf 7.12.51 Methoden der wachsenden 
Produktivitätssteigerung bei Aufrechterhaltung des gegenwärtigen Lebensstandards.  
27 JO 1951. 8873. December 6, 1951. 
28 Verhandlungen des deutschen Bundestages, 1.Wahlperiode. 7714-16. January 10, 1952. 
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3. SFIO and SPD Efforts on Behalf of Workers in the ECSC, 1952-
1954 
 
SPD leaders did not abandon their criticism of the ECSC during the Community‟s 
formative stage. Rather, they argued that the results of the first years of the ECSC 
confirmed the validity of their initial critique. Ollenhauer claimed in April 1954 that the 
negative effects of the community had even exceeded the fears that his party had 
expressed during the ratification period29. The party‟s delegates to the ECSC pursued 
this line within the Common Assembly. Wehner argued that employers and technocrats 
dominated the ECSC‟s operations. Joachim Schöne complained that the High Authority 
was proving itself ineffective and that the industries themselves seemed to have taken 
over decision-making30. 
Despite this criticism, the party adopted a pragmatic approach to its involvement in 
the ECSC. As they had done after opposing West Germany‟s entry into the Council of 
Europe, once the Bundestag ratified the Treaty of Rome, the party sent delegates to the 
Common Assembly in an effort to attain and wield as much influence within the 
Community as possible31. The principal task that the party assigned itself in its dealings 
with the ECSC was to strengthen the power of the Common Assembly vis-à-vis 
employers‟ organizations and the High Authority. Here the French Socialist Party was 
an important ally, as it shared the goal of a greater democratization of the Community, 
which meant to French Socialists and German Social Democrats an extension of the 
Assembly‟s powers. During the constitutive session of the Assembly, Wehner insisted 
that the proposal of the Christian Democratic group to limit the number of Assembly 
committees would restrict the powers of the Assembly. He proposed to the Socialist 
Group a list of specialized committees to enable greater supervision of the Community‟s 
activities. Among these was a commission for work and social questions. Wehner‟s 
report became the official position of the Socialist Group, and this ensured the creation 
of a number of specialized committees in the ECSC Assembly32. 
The High Authority proved not to be the intrusive, dictatorial body that many in the 
SPD had feared. In fact, the party‟s representatives tended to argue in the Common 
Assembly that the High Authority was not exercising enough power. Willi Birkelbach, 
                                                 
29 AdsD, SPD Parteivorstand 1954, Neuer Vorwärts April 9, 1954, «Gescheiterte Bonner 
Europapolitik». 
30 IISH, Confederation of the Socialist Parties of the European Community (CSPEC) 28. January 
13, 1954. 
31 AdsD, BEO 96, Ansprache von Erich Ollenhauer am Sonntag, dem 2. August 1953, 11,45 Uhr, 
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32 IISH, CSPEC 28, September 12, 1952.  
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Gerhard Kreyssig, Joachim Schöne and Herbert Wehner criticized the High 
Commissioners on numerous occasions for not taking advantage of the full range of 
authority granted by the Treaty of Paris. What this approach seemed to imply was that 
the SPD did not view the High Authority to be discriminating against Germany in favor 
of French industry as they had previously argued that it would, though Gerhard 
Kreyssig condemned the High Authority for not taking sufficient measures to rectify the 
disadvantages with which German industry entered the Community33. Rather, the party 
feared more the effects of economic liberalism on the German working class. The treaty 
granted the High Authority the power to safeguard employment, promote and 
harmonize working and living conditions for workers, promote technical and economic 
research on occupational safety, help finance the re-adaptation of workers who suffered 
unemployment due to the competitive effects of the customs union, and ensure that the 
states did not create obstacles to the employment of other member states‟ workers34. 
The French Socialist and German Social Democratic parties set themselves the task of 
pressuring the High Authority to enforce these provisions with the greatest amount of 
haste and authority that was legally possible. 
Adequate housing for workers had long been a priority for the French Socialist 
Party. The party wished to rectify the bias of the Monnet Plan towards heavy 
investment, which had left France with an increasingly acute housing shortage in the 
early 1950s35. The promise of Community-financed housing construction became the 
most conspicuous component of the ECSC‟s social program. Monnet promised the 
Assembly on multiple occasions that the High Authority would engage in a large-scale 
construction program36. In January 1954, Willi Birkelbach delivered a report of a sub-
commission of the Assembly‟s social affairs committee that had undertaken an 
extensive tour of workers‟ housing in the Lorraine, the Saarland, the Ruhr, 
Luxembourg, Limbourg and Liège. Everywhere the sub-commission had found 
«miserable lodging, houses in ruins, homes very distant from work sites, overpopulated 
housing». He told the Assembly that, «The misery that we found shocked us». He 
implored the High Authority to move quickly from its current investigation of housing 
conditions to immediate action. In addition, he asked that the construction program 
                                                 
33 Archive of European Integration (AEI), Communuaté Europeenne du Charbon et de l‟Acier 
(CECA), Assemblée commune compte rendu in-extenso des séances. January 12, 1953. 
34 SPIERENBURG, Dirk & POIDEVIN, Raymond. The History of the High Authority of the 
European Coal and Steel Community: Supranationality in Operation, London, Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1994, p. 175. 
35 RIOUX, Jean-Pierre, The Fourth Republic, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp. 
175, 181, 190. 
36 AEI, CECA. Assemblée commune, January 12, 15 1953, pp. 18-19.  
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take close account of the material and social conditions of the workers, and that the 
High Authority should prevent long-term housing contracts linked to work contracts, 
which would give employers additional leverage over their workers. He also 
recommended that the housing program encourage the acquisition of property by 
workers but that it also be careful to ensure that the accompanying expenses not exceed 
workers‟ capacities. By way of example, he deplored the prospect of workers‟ children 
being unable to move from their regions to pursue studies because of the financial 
burden of property acquisition by their family37. 
In 1954, the SFIO and SPD remained disappointed by the meager results of the 
ECSC housing program. After promising to build 50 to 60.000 houses in a year, Jean 
Monnet scaled back the project to 20 to 25.000, having received a smaller loan from 
the United States than initially envisioned38. 
French Socialists and German Social Democrats were also not satisfied by the 
efforts of the High Authority to achieve full employment, nor did they think that the 
Community provided adequate assistance to those workers displaced by the customs 
union39. Mollet told the Socialist International in February 1954 that the High 
Authority must immediately launch a re-employment policy with subsidies for lost 
work time, relocation and, eventually, the financing of professional re-education40. 
Mollet‟s speech followed a December 1953 request by the French government for High 
Authority financial assistance to redeploy miners from the Centre-Midi region to the 
Lorraine, after these mines closed due to the competitive pressures of the Community. 
In March 1954, the High Authority granted the French government 500 million francs 
for this program but few miners were willing to relocate41. No doubt aware of the 
results of this program, Guy Mollet called in June 1955 for the High Authority to 
finance the «reemployment on site in other businesses», communitarian assistance for 
the unemployed, and a guaranteed European minimum wage42. 
SPD delegates, in turn, placed special emphasis on the precarious state of migrant 
workers. Louise Schröder reported that the High Authority had responded to her 
inquiries about the treatment of migrant workers by answering that this issue lay 
                                                 
37 Ibid. May 13, 1954, pp. 61-69.  
38 SPIERENBURG, Dirk & POIDEVIN, Raymond, op. cit. p. 180. 
39 AdsD, Bestand Fritz Erler 7, Fritz Erler in Sozialdemokratische Pressedienst May 18, 1951, 
«Strassburger Zwischenbilanz». 
40 OURS, Archive Guy Mollet (AGM) 106, Discours au Congrès de l‟I.,. Les Autorités 
européennes, 23 Fevrier 1954. 
41 SPIERENBURG, Dirk & POIDEVIN, Raymond, op. cit., op. 183. 
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within the competence of the national states43. Birkelbach also raised this concern in 
the Common Assembly and called on the High Authority to create a European workers‟ 
passport, a periodic exchange of lists of available employment, an elimination of 
difficulties associated with relocation, and social loans to smooth migration44. SFIO and 
SPD deputies displayed an appreciation for the technical reports on social and 
economic conditions provided by the High Authority on this and other issues, which 
represented a difficult task due to diverging national conditions for gathering statistics. 
They demanded a larger budget to facilitate more extensive surveys of working and 
migration conditions, as well as statistics for professional maladies, workers‟ 
purchasing power, unemployment rates, and a comparison of salaries45. Such demands 
are all indicative of a desire for a more interventionist supranational authority in social 
policy. 
One issue continued to dominate French Socialist policy toward the ECSC: the 
demand for the harmonization of social costs among the participating nations. The 
High Commission refused to take measures to equalize salaries among coal and steel 
workers, saying that the treaty did not grant them this power. French Socialist delegate 
Roger Carcassonne responded that varying wage levels represented an obstacle to free 
competition46. At the 14 May 1954 meeting of the Socialist Group of the ECSC 
Assembly, Mollet succeeded in having his Socialist colleagues adopt the SFIO position. 
According to the resolution, the group demanded that the High Authority sponsor «a 
general conference of the six states with the purpose of establishing a convention to 
eliminate divergences between social legislation that cannot be corrected through 
collective bargaining»47. This policy area, like others mentioned above, remained 
unresolved when Belgian Socialist Paul-Henri Spaak gave his report at the Messina 
conference that launched the negotiations for a European Economic Community (EEC). 
When Guy Mollet became Prime Minister of France in 1956, his government demanded 
that the harmonization of social legislation be a central component of the negotiations 
for the Treaties of Rome, which set up the EEC. In varying forms, this demand 
remained a key demand of French Socialists up to the present day, and has recently 
become a more pronounced part of SPD policy on European integration. 
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The French Socialist and the German Social Democratic parties were dissatisfied by 
the accomplishments of the ECSC in the field of social policy in the mid-1950s. Having 
long supported supranationalism in principle, SFIO leaders fought to include an 
equalization of salaries and social costs in any program for economic liberalization. At 
the same time, a marked shift had occurred within the SPD‟s analysis of the High 
Authority. Having criticized the Schuman Plan for proposing a dictatorial body, the 
party delegates now criticized the High Authority for not aggressively pursuing social 
objectives. This assessment contributed to the party‟s ultimate decision to support the 
creation of the EEC, which also contained a supranational institution, the High 
Commission. It is likely that, having seen their chances of taking power at the national 
level diminish with the electoral loss of 1953, the SPD hoped to see some of its goals 
achieved within the ECSC, where it could perhaps gain greater influence over social 
policy. French Socialists and German Social Democrats were consistent critics of the 
paucity of the ECSC‟s social achievements in this period. 
SFIO and SPD pressure for a more active social policy to aid the Community‟s 
workers was not without effect. In fact, a substantial number of SFIO and SPD 
proposals in the Common Assembly from 1952-1954 were put into place by the High 
Commission from 1955 until the merger of the High Commission with the EEC‟s 
institutions in 1967. Despite a slow start, the High Authority had helped finance the 
construction of over 77.000 houses for workers by 1964; it pressured the governments 
to sign a European Social Security Convention in 1957 that guaranteed equal benefits 
for migrant workers; after the crisis in the coal industry began, the High Authority 
succeeded in having the member governments amend the Treaty of Paris to allow it to 
assist coal and steel workers who became unemployed due to «fundamental changes… 
in market conditions», resulting in assistance to 162.000 displaced workers from 1960-
1967, the majority of whom were German; and the High Authority increasingly 
sponsored research into occupational diseases, focusing especially on the impact of 
high temperatures and dust48. The harmonization of social charges, however, remained 
elusive. 
Although this last point remains beyond the scope of this article, there is little doubt 
that SFIO and SPD pressures in the ECSC led over the long term to a smoother and less 
socially damaging de-industrialization process as crisis hit the west European coal and 
                                                 
48 SPIERENBURG, Dirk, POIDEVIN, Raymond, op. cit. pp. 331-332, 547, 553, 637. 
The French Socialist and German Social Democratic Parties and the Future of the Working Class 
in the European Coal & Steel Community, 1948-1954 
 
Diacronie. Studi di Storia Contemporanea  
 
18 
steel industries. Designed initially to modernize and expand coal and steel production, 
the High Authority instead spent much of its existence managing the decline of 
Western European heavy industry and shielding the sectors‟ workers from the 
devastating impact of sudden, insurmountable unemployment. 
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